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Côte d'Ivoire Crisis

Lessons Learned

The first lesson to draw here is the fact that despite its Conflict Prevention and Good Governance Mechanism in place, ECOWAS once again is caught in a reactionary position. An opportunity to make an input in the domain of peacebuilding and conflict prevention was provided for by the forum on national reconciliation.

The political will for inclusive politics of all Ivorians should have been emphasized. West African leaders should have played a critical role in this regard. The political ambiguity surrounding the issue of ivoirité has now defined ECOWAS' intervention as reactionary rather than pro-active.

ECOWAS and the rest of the international community unfortunately watched the Ivorian reconciliation forum unfold (which went well). The issues that were overlooked and considered minor have now built up and engulfed the nation in a crisis of great magnitude with regional ramifications.

Moreover, the isolationist attitude of Côte d'Ivoire itself has not helped. It should be recalled that Côte d'Ivoire had not be involved in the peace missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Instead, late President Houphouet supported Charles Taylor's rebellion against Samuel Doe in apparent revenge for the Doe's assassination of his in laws.

Côte d'Ivoire thus opposed the Nigerian-led ECOMOG intervention, although French economic interests and their fear of Nigerian hegemony in the sub-region were some of the reasons behind the Ivorian stance.

It is important to state here that Houphouet Boigny's Côte d'Ivoire was among the few African countries that supported the Biafran secessionist attempt, a move that severed relations between Yamoussoukrou and Lagos.

Today, Nigeria became the first West African country to send military jets in support of Gbagbo. Just as was the case in Liberia, Obassanjo knows that the rebel adventure in Cote d'Ivoire as in any other West African country can have devastating effects especially in a country like Nigeria where the propensity to violence is so high and the dreams of secession are ever rife.

Drawing from the situation in Liberia in the 90s, Oquaye came out with eight (8) lessons learned from the "uneasy trajectories of ECOWAS intervention" which are still relevant to the Ivorian context as the sub-regional body braces up for yet another intervention.

The poor democratic credentials of ECOWAS leaders, says Oquaye, constitute a stumbling block to effective diplomacy and collective conflict resolution. ECOWAS leaders lack the moral right to censure those who seek power through conflict. The absence of a coordinated early warning system made West African leaders unaware of the magnitude and implications of issues around them. There is therefore a need to develop an effective early-warning system in the region.

The Anglophone-Francophone dichotomy took a toll during the Liberian civil war. Distrust and feuding on linguistic lines has plagued ECOWAS and the OAU (Now African Union). It is necessary to tackle the problem boldly.

In addition, the huge financial cost and the unwillingness of countries like Nigeria and Ghana that bore the financial brunt of intervention forced them to conceal exact figures due to the fear of internal political ramifications. ECOWAS should therefore devise a strategy whereby no war monger or war lord should be allowed to obtain or contest for political power.

This could be dissuasive attempt against the use of force to ascend to power. ECOWAS should endeavour to set up a disciplined force. The interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone were marred by indiscipline and human rights abuse by the peace-keepers.

Effective regional intervention, argues Van Walraven depends ultimately on the nature and quality of the leadership and political system of the intervening state itself. In intervention therefore, one needs to evaluate the rationales and instruments of interventions, for these impact directly on the efficacy out come of the intervention. Motives, means and ends, he says, are inseparable.