Alert!
Côte d'Ivoire
Crisis
Early
Warning Signals
Prior to
mutiny turned attempted coup, there was a spectacular hold-up in the
Central Bank of West Africa (BCEAO) Abidjan on August 27, 2002. The
robbery took place in broad daylight and the robbers made away with
a colossal sum of more than 2 billion CFA Francs.
The Ivorian
press called this the "hold-up of the century". The BCEAO robbery seriously
put to question the credibility of the Ivorian security apparatus. The
prime suspect, Sia Popo Prosper hails from the Man region, incidentally
the home town of General Gueï.
The pro-government
daily, Le National did not hesitate to see an external hand in the infamous
theft. Although investigations are on going, the ruling party and its
sympathetic press organs started pointing an accusing finger at Alassane
Ouattara as the brain behind the plot, and General Gueï as having connived
with his kinsman to loot the BCEAO.
Local press
reports critical of the government claims recall that this was not the
first bank robbery attempt. In July 2000, the BCEAO office in Bouaké
was reportedly attacked by unidentified security forces for close to
four hours. Another attack at the Central Bank on October 13, 2000 (purportedly
by soldiers) failed.
The coup
d'état and /or mutiny syndrome has been haunting the country for long.
In 1990 a mutiny occurred as junior soldiers attempted a protest violent
against the late payment of their monthly dues. Fearing an escalation,
President Houphouet Boigny recalled Gueï from a punitive transfer to
the 4th military region at Korhogo (scene of present hostility as the
barracks have been taken over by the rebellious soldiers) to suppress
the mutineers.
The brain
behind the mutiny was Colonel Gustave Ouffoué, a close associate of
former President Henri Konan Bedié. Gueï's compensation for a job well
done was his appointment as the Chief of Armed Forces Staff of the Ivorian
Army, and later promoted to rank of Brigadier General. He formed the
rapid intervention commando forces (FIRPAC) that suppressed the numerous
students' manifestations of 1991.
After the
death of Houphouet Boigny in 1993, Henri Konan Bedié, the "institutional
successor," requested Gen. Gueï to put Alassane Ouattara (who claimed
to be the "legitimate successor" to Houphouet) under house arrest.
However,
the two men (Gueï and Bedié) did not see eye to eye. Their animosity
again manifested itself during the 1995 general elections. The General
refused to heed to the President's orders to use the military in quelling
the students and political manifestations. "The army would only intervene
when the Republic is in danger," Gueï maintained. This attitude of defiance
cost him his job and in 1996, he was accused of fomenting a coup. He
nevertheless escaped any trial and in 1999, Gueï and other accused benefitted
from a general amnesty.
Another
alarm of a coup plot was raised in September 2000. General Gueï claimed
that Generals Lansana Palenfo and Abdoulaye Coulibaly were plotting
to take over power. The suspects were arrested and jailed. Observers
dismissed the claim as mere ploy to keep potential rivals off the scene.
The two
and other accused were later tried in March 2001 under Gbagbo's administration.
Palenfo was sentenced to one year imprisonment and his colleague acquitted.
Although the case was closed, mutual suspicion and ethnic tendencies
persisted especially as the two Generals hail from the north, considered
the fief of Alassane Ouattara, a political rival.
In January
2001, there was an alleged coup mounted by opposition elements within
the army. Many arrests were made. In May this year, six soldiers were
sentenced to prison terms with some bagging up to 20 years.
Thus alarms
about coups, imagined or real have consistently marked the Ivorian political
scene to the extent that it is difficult to discern the reality from
a ploy. This is the case with a recent allegation of a possible rebel
attack. Le National of September 6, 2002 in a caption "Destabilization
of Côte d'Ivoire" claimed that a former Liberian fighter had helped
ferry a consignment of arms into the country on behalf of the RDR party,
with the help of a certain Gouanou Alexis, secretary general of the
youths of the greater west.
The information
contained in a tract that was dated August 14 is said to have been leaked
by an anonymous soldier who gave details of the planned attack. About
953 assailant soldiers were recruited for the mission, out of which
621 were Ivorians, 200 Burkinabes, and 132 youths. This, the paper claimed,
was dismissed as mere propaganda and machination.
Indeed,
Côte d'Ivoire has been sailing in the sea of instability. During the
campaign for the July 2002 district elections won outright by Ouattara's
RDR, there were violent clashes between supporters of Ouattara and Gbagbo
in the town of Dalao.
Perhaps,
what seemed to have allowed the government to claim that General Gueï
is responsible for the present crisis lies in his recent decisions and/or
declarations. Relations between Gueï and his successor swiftly deteriorated
soon after the forum on national reconciliation. Gueï's request for
the status of a former head of state and the benefits thereof became
a bone of contention.
Although
he was believed to have endorsed the participation of one of his militants
in the August 5 government of national union, Gueï soon backed out and
announced that the UDPCI was not part of Gbagbo's political masquerade.
His assessment of Gbagbo's sincerity is summarized in this statement:
"What type of a President is this that manipulates people like a bread
baker mixing every body in his bread". He went ahead to warn that if
Gbagbo attempts to use force, he (Gueï) would consider that as an open
declaration of war.
If this
was not enough, the retired General and former military ruler while
addressing the youths of his party on September7 declared that no one
individual in Côte d'Ivoire had the monopoly of violence, promising
reprisal should any one of his followers be touched. "…I will soon set
the example my self."
These threatening
statements, observers say were enough proof to implicate the retired
General in the mutiny turned coup d'état. He and his entourage are no
longer there to testify. How Gueï died, supposedly shot in the streets
fighting along side the mutineers, is highly contested by analysts.
Others have said that perhaps even if he was not behind the coup, thought
centered on him because of recent pronouncements.
"It is
Gueï's lousy mouth that put him in trouble," a colleague concluded.
These analysts are of the opinion that Gueï's uncontrolled and sentimental
statements provided the much needed excuse for the powers that be to
eliminate him. The assassination of the wife, body guard and grand child
was meant to destroy all traces of witness account.
In addition,
the state monopoly of the audio-visual media and the disconnection of
the local FM relay transmission of the largely diffused BBC, RFI and
Africa No.1 have done little to allay public fears that the government
has got skeletons in the backyard. Jerome Diegou-Bailly, president of
the national audio-visual commission, speaking over state-run radio
and television, attempted to explain the disconnection of the radio
waves by saying that it was necessary to stop the spread of false information
that could lead to more deaths or disruptions. The pro-ruling party
tabloid, Notre Voie of September23 brandished the afore-cited radio
stations as opponents of Côte d'Ivoire, blaming them for stirring issues.