Home About WANEP Mission & VIsion Programs Members Publications Contact Us
 
About WANEP
Message from Chairman
Operating Principles
WANEP Staff
Annual Report
Home
 
Alert!
 


Alert!

Côte d'Ivoire Crisis

Early Warning Signals

Prior to mutiny turned attempted coup, there was a spectacular hold-up in the Central Bank of West Africa (BCEAO) Abidjan on August 27, 2002. The robbery took place in broad daylight and the robbers made away with a colossal sum of more than 2 billion CFA Francs.

The Ivorian press called this the "hold-up of the century". The BCEAO robbery seriously put to question the credibility of the Ivorian security apparatus. The prime suspect, Sia Popo Prosper hails from the Man region, incidentally the home town of General Gueï.

The pro-government daily, Le National did not hesitate to see an external hand in the infamous theft. Although investigations are on going, the ruling party and its sympathetic press organs started pointing an accusing finger at Alassane Ouattara as the brain behind the plot, and General Gueï as having connived with his kinsman to loot the BCEAO.

Local press reports critical of the government claims recall that this was not the first bank robbery attempt. In July 2000, the BCEAO office in Bouaké was reportedly attacked by unidentified security forces for close to four hours. Another attack at the Central Bank on October 13, 2000 (purportedly by soldiers) failed.

The coup d'état and /or mutiny syndrome has been haunting the country for long. In 1990 a mutiny occurred as junior soldiers attempted a protest violent against the late payment of their monthly dues. Fearing an escalation, President Houphouet Boigny recalled Gueï from a punitive transfer to the 4th military region at Korhogo (scene of present hostility as the barracks have been taken over by the rebellious soldiers) to suppress the mutineers.

The brain behind the mutiny was Colonel Gustave Ouffoué, a close associate of former President Henri Konan Bedié. Gueï's compensation for a job well done was his appointment as the Chief of Armed Forces Staff of the Ivorian Army, and later promoted to rank of Brigadier General. He formed the rapid intervention commando forces (FIRPAC) that suppressed the numerous students' manifestations of 1991.

After the death of Houphouet Boigny in 1993, Henri Konan Bedié, the "institutional successor," requested Gen. Gueï to put Alassane Ouattara (who claimed to be the "legitimate successor" to Houphouet) under house arrest.

However, the two men (Gueï and Bedié) did not see eye to eye. Their animosity again manifested itself during the 1995 general elections. The General refused to heed to the President's orders to use the military in quelling the students and political manifestations. "The army would only intervene when the Republic is in danger," Gueï maintained. This attitude of defiance cost him his job and in 1996, he was accused of fomenting a coup. He nevertheless escaped any trial and in 1999, Gueï and other accused benefitted from a general amnesty.

Another alarm of a coup plot was raised in September 2000. General Gueï claimed that Generals Lansana Palenfo and Abdoulaye Coulibaly were plotting to take over power. The suspects were arrested and jailed. Observers dismissed the claim as mere ploy to keep potential rivals off the scene.

The two and other accused were later tried in March 2001 under Gbagbo's administration. Palenfo was sentenced to one year imprisonment and his colleague acquitted. Although the case was closed, mutual suspicion and ethnic tendencies persisted especially as the two Generals hail from the north, considered the fief of Alassane Ouattara, a political rival.

In January 2001, there was an alleged coup mounted by opposition elements within the army. Many arrests were made. In May this year, six soldiers were sentenced to prison terms with some bagging up to 20 years.

Thus alarms about coups, imagined or real have consistently marked the Ivorian political scene to the extent that it is difficult to discern the reality from a ploy. This is the case with a recent allegation of a possible rebel attack. Le National of September 6, 2002 in a caption "Destabilization of Côte d'Ivoire" claimed that a former Liberian fighter had helped ferry a consignment of arms into the country on behalf of the RDR party, with the help of a certain Gouanou Alexis, secretary general of the youths of the greater west.

The information contained in a tract that was dated August 14 is said to have been leaked by an anonymous soldier who gave details of the planned attack. About 953 assailant soldiers were recruited for the mission, out of which 621 were Ivorians, 200 Burkinabes, and 132 youths. This, the paper claimed, was dismissed as mere propaganda and machination.

Indeed, Côte d'Ivoire has been sailing in the sea of instability. During the campaign for the July 2002 district elections won outright by Ouattara's RDR, there were violent clashes between supporters of Ouattara and Gbagbo in the town of Dalao.

Perhaps, what seemed to have allowed the government to claim that General Gueï is responsible for the present crisis lies in his recent decisions and/or declarations. Relations between Gueï and his successor swiftly deteriorated soon after the forum on national reconciliation. Gueï's request for the status of a former head of state and the benefits thereof became a bone of contention.

Although he was believed to have endorsed the participation of one of his militants in the August 5 government of national union, Gueï soon backed out and announced that the UDPCI was not part of Gbagbo's political masquerade. His assessment of Gbagbo's sincerity is summarized in this statement: "What type of a President is this that manipulates people like a bread baker mixing every body in his bread". He went ahead to warn that if Gbagbo attempts to use force, he (Gueï) would consider that as an open declaration of war.

If this was not enough, the retired General and former military ruler while addressing the youths of his party on September7 declared that no one individual in Côte d'Ivoire had the monopoly of violence, promising reprisal should any one of his followers be touched. "…I will soon set the example my self."

These threatening statements, observers say were enough proof to implicate the retired General in the mutiny turned coup d'état. He and his entourage are no longer there to testify. How Gueï died, supposedly shot in the streets fighting along side the mutineers, is highly contested by analysts. Others have said that perhaps even if he was not behind the coup, thought centered on him because of recent pronouncements.

"It is Gueï's lousy mouth that put him in trouble," a colleague concluded. These analysts are of the opinion that Gueï's uncontrolled and sentimental statements provided the much needed excuse for the powers that be to eliminate him. The assassination of the wife, body guard and grand child was meant to destroy all traces of witness account.

In addition, the state monopoly of the audio-visual media and the disconnection of the local FM relay transmission of the largely diffused BBC, RFI and Africa No.1 have done little to allay public fears that the government has got skeletons in the backyard. Jerome Diegou-Bailly, president of the national audio-visual commission, speaking over state-run radio and television, attempted to explain the disconnection of the radio waves by saying that it was necessary to stop the spread of false information that could lead to more deaths or disruptions. The pro-ruling party tabloid, Notre Voie of September23 brandished the afore-cited radio stations as opponents of Côte d'Ivoire, blaming them for stirring issues.

     
 

Home | About WANEP | Mission & Vision | Programs | Members | Publications | Contact Us

© Copyright 2002AD. West Africa Network for Peacebuilding. All Rights Reserved.