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Côte d'Ivoire Crisis: WANEP Policy Briefs Update - December 3, 2002

Analysis of the crisis

The emergence of the rebellion in the west has indeed complicated the Ivorian crisis and rendered the possibility of a negotiated peace settlement fragile. A number of reasons justify this assertion as we attempt an analysis of the crisis.

By breaking the monopoly of the MPCI, the new rebellions may weaken the MPCI position in the ongoing peace process in Lomé. The MPCI of Soro Guillaume and co had secured concessions but remained adamant to new demands of fresh elections within six months under international supervision and other political demands in what they call a "new political order" in Cote d'Ivoire. It is difficult whether the government would be willing to extend the same olive branch of peace and concessions to the western front rebellion and what this may entail. The risk of a mushrooming of splinter rebel groups, a phenomenon which is as old as the history of conflicts in West Africa is likely.

Given the fact that one of the MPCI rebel leaders, Tuo Fozié, says he does not recognize the ceasefire that gave birth to the Lomé peace process, the Ivorian FANCI military offensive that started in Vavoua and is now gaining ground in the west (Man and Danane) may sooner than later spread to the rest of the rebel held territories. However, the limited capacity of the FANCI may be a major constrain to this option, despite the expertise of the government mercenaries.

Apparently, the decision by the international community to pressurize the government of Laurent Gbagbo to negotiate with rebels might have been a dangerous precedent. By opting to negotiate, observers say, the international community has legitimized the power of the gun. Advocates of this line of thought maintain that even the French troops had to "violate" their own rules for they could no longer bear wrath of the rebellion.

The Saturday military confrontation in Man marked the first ever confrontation between the French and rebel movement in post independent contemporary African history. About 10 rebels were killed. The French took over the local Airport at Man and handed over control to the Ivorian armed forces-FANCI that has since been engaged in a mopping up operation, although part of Man is still under rebel control. The MPJ has expanded their grip to Touba, an important sugar producing area. WANEP still sticks to its principle of a negotiated peace process, given the carrot and stick policy options on the ground.

Man is situated at the heart of the Dan ethnic group (also known as the Yacouba) which also extends to localities Biankouma, Binhouin, Danané, Logoualé, Zéalé, Zouanouhien, and across the Liberian and Guinean frontier. It is the nerve centre of the Ivorian coffee production (Côte d'Ivoire is Africa's leading producer of coffee). We are presently in the coffee and cocoa harvest season. The spread of the conflict coast wards to frontier town of Toulépleu (Toulobli) can further complicate the matter. In April this year (2002), a confrontation occurred between Ivorian and Liberian villagers over a 2500 hectares parcel of land in the Séhibly locality and a military confrontation was barely averted. Territorial claims in the Toulépleu, according to Soir Info newspaper (issue of April 20-21, 2002) had existed since the years of presidents Houphouët and Tolbert of Liberia. Old wounds may be opened.

That the MPCI has not in any of its ever growing list of demands table the death of General Gueï as a major precondition renders the theory of General Gueï involvement in the coup turned rebellion shallow. It also means that the MPCI, most of whose members and leadership had an axe to grind with General Guei whom they gave power to on a silver platter and he later turned against them had less sympathy for the slain General. This might have angered Guei's supporters and zealous tribesmen. The western rebellion has therefore capitalized on Guei's death and initiated what can be qualified as purely ethnic war. However, declarations from both the MPCI and the MJP-MPIGO lend credence to the possibility of an eminent strategic alliance, if one is not yet in place.

The MJP-MPIGO rebellion claims their men are already stationed in the port town of San Pedro. The strategic importance of San Pedro cannot be over-emphasized.

• San Pedro is Côte d'Ivoire's second largest port, after the autonomous port of Abidjan. It has so far been the feasible economically strategic outlet through which the tons of Ivorian cocoa, cotton and coffee is exported to the international market.
• San Pedro (and by implication neighbouring ports such as Tabou and Sanssandra, Fresco, and Grand-Lahou) are the enviable targets of both the MPCI and MJP-MPIGO rebellions for both economic and military reasons. Supplies into the rebel-held territory could be directed through this port.
• San Pedro could also be a window for armed marauders and traffickers who are taking advantage of the situation to impose their law in the sub-region. Intelligence sources say this was the port used by the Liberian government and its collaborators (perhaps with or without the consent of Abidjan) to ferry arms into the country despite the United Nations arms embargo for supporting the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebellion in Sierra Leone.